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 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS21R) appeared in March 2015.1 It aims to “refresh” the strategy with the 
same primary title that first appeared back in 2007 and that has to a significant 
extent guided U.S. maritime policy over the past eight years.2 Navies both reflect 
and help shape the international context. They matter. So, when the world’s most 
powerful navy looks at its strategy and decides on a change, the rest of the world 
should pay attention, since the change will reveal at least some of America’s stra-
tegic preoccupations and help set the agenda, for a few years at least, for diplo-
mats and other navies around the world. Most especially this will of course apply 
in regions as maritime as the Asia-Pacific. How 
navies or nations react will depend first on what 
they think has changed and why, and, second, on 
who and where they are.
A number of questions immediately arise: What 
is this new “strategy,” whom is it for, and what’s 
changed? The first of these is relatively simple to 
answer. It’s what most people would call a state-
ment of doctrine, something intended to provide 
guidance for those serving in today’s U.S. Navy, 
especially its planners. Unlike grand statements 
of strategy as produced by the likes of Carl von 
Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian 
Corbett, doctrine is evanescent; it is a menu for 
today and so constantly needs to be assessed and 
adapted in the light of experience and changing 
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THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY
circumstances� CS21R identifies some of these changes (such as fiscal constraint 
and the rise of China) and, rightly, the need for a “refresh”; these things indeed 
need thinking about�
The second question—Whom is it for?—is more complicated� The fact that 
CS21R has been issued as a public document shows that it is not just an exercise 
in raising the level of strategic thought within the Navy, entirely laudable though 
that aspiration would be�3 The drafters of CS21R may have wished to target the 
audience in their three maritime services, but they knew there were other very 
important domestic audiences too—the rest of the Department of Defense, the 
administration, Congress, defense literati, the public, to name just a few� Trans-
lating CS21R into several languages reflected assumptions that it would also be 
widely read around the world� All these different audiences, with their diverse 
interests (and their likely tendency to fasten on those parts of the document that 
support conclusions they already have!), had to be catered for to some extent� 
The difficulty is that what is said to appeal to one audience will worry another� 
Accordingly, balances had to be struck, words chosen with care� That’s because, 
in essence, CS21R is for nearly everyone, whatever its drafters may have intended�
But one thing that all these diverse audiences have in common is wanting to 
know the answer to the final question—What’s changed? How different is the 
“refreshed” version from the original? The answer most of them will come to is 
“quite a lot�” For a start, it’s much longer, it looks different, and so far, the video 
isn’t as good� CS21R comprises two opening review sections—of the world and of 
what the U�S� maritime services need to do� This merges into a complex discus-
sion of their seven missions and five functions (see the figure)�
The main focus for discussion in this strategy is the functions rather than 
the missions� The missions presumably are thought to flow naturally out of the 
review, conducted in Sections I and II, of the international context and how, 
broadly, the United States feels it needs to respond� There’s plenty of evidence 
to be found in those sections for all of these missions, but they’re not much spe-
cifically discussed, and neither, 
really, is how the functions 
will support them�4 Instead, 
the emphasis is on the five 
functions themselves� It’s these 
that will therefore command 
attention� The final section of 
CS21R shows how the neces-
sary capabilities will be grown�
There is now much less di-
rect emphasis than there was 
Seven missions  . . . and five functions
 •  Defend the homeland  *  All-domain access
 •  Deter conflict  *  Deterrence
 •  Respond to crises  *  Sea control
 •  Defeat aggression  *  Power projection
 •  Protect the maritime commons  *  Maritime security
 •  Strengthen partnerships
 •  Provide humanitarian assistance  
 and disaster response
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in 2007 on the role of the U�S� maritime forces in contributing to the defense of 
the global sea-based trading system� That aspiration is still there of course, being 
implicit in the continuing accents on working with allies and partners in a “global 
network of navies” to secure international stability and maritime security and on 
the continued American determination to safeguard the freedom of navigation 
on which Washington thinks the system depends� This reduced emphasis on the 
systemic justification for U�S� seapower doubtless reflects the fact that in the 2007 
version of the strategy, it did not go down well in Congress—which ultimately 
pays the Navy’s bills� There are already signs that CS21R will do better in this 
respect�5
Instead, readers will find and many will welcome a more muscular emphasis 
on the defense of U�S� national interests at sea�6 “Defending our Nation,” said the 
first iteration of the fact sheet that accompanied the strategy, “and winning its 
wars is the core task of the U�S� Navy and U�S� Marine Corps�”7 On the face of it, 
there is nothing very remarkable in this� Most of the world’s navies, when push 
comes to shove, would say the same thing, but many of them would adulterate the 
message a little by giving greater prominence to the task of preventing wars rather 
than just winning them� Of course, the strategy’s writers will argue that prevent-
ing wars is implicit in the notion of defending national interests and ensuring 
stability; also conventional “deterrence” is specifically identified, as the second 
of both the seven missions of the sea services and their five essential supporting 
functions� 
The notion that ensuring stability prevents wars runs like a leitmotiv through-
out the glittering but intricate missions/functions structure of CS21R’s Section 
III but is not specifically articulated and could, given the limited coverage of the 
nature of the missions, easily be missed by foreign observers less well attuned 
to American ways of thinking about maritime strategy� There is moreover just 
one paragraph on conventional deterrence in a section that has twenty-six oth-
ers� Each function is justified by being shown to support several of the missions 
identified earlier of the U�S� Navy; in every case “defending the homeland” comes 
first� This is clearly nation-centric rather than system-centric�
Several additional aspects of the refreshed strategy seem at first glance to point 
in the same more muscular direction� First “humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response” (HADR) is now relegated from being one of the six main functions of 
the U�S� Navy to being a subset of the capacity to project power ashore� This task 
had been given a new and special prominence in the original 2007 version of the 
strategy and of course has been practiced extensively over the past eight years, 
most recently in dealing with Typhoon Haiyun in the Philippines� No doubt the 
Navy will continue to perform this function as it always has, but HADR’s con-
ceptual downgrading will nonetheless seem significant to outsiders� This may 
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particularly apply in the Asia-Pacific, where many of these disasters take place 
and where the HADR task is now given much conceptual prominence�8 
The increased muscularity of the new version of the strategy comes out in 
other ways too� Oddly, there seems to be less opportunity to talk of the soft-power 
advantages of naval diplomacy, an infinitely flexible means of winning friends 
and influencing people� Again, in some quarters, the first version of the strategy 
was criticized for not being a “strategy” in the sense that it neither delved into 
“ends, ways, and means” nor offered much in the way of specific guidance to force 
planners on future acquisitions�9 It simply identified the “ends�” If this criticism 
was just (and by no means had everyone thought it was), then the deficiency has 
been corrected this time�10 The concluding Section IV is all about force design 
and building the future force, with explicit targets for the future fleet (Coast 
Guard, Navy, and amphibious) clearly identified� It shows how the necessary 
technological capacities and human skills have to be grown and developed to 
deliver the capabilities needed for the five functions listed earlier�11 It’s all very 
logical, businesslike, and “back to basics�” It identifies what it thinks is necessary� 
The implication is clear—so now give us the resources!12
The same sense of a shift toward war-fighting and hard-power thinking 
emerges in the appearance of a new major function of maritime power, that of 
assuring “all domain access,” which now comes first in the list of the U�S� Navy’s 
maritime functions and therefore inevitably looks as though it is the most impor-
tant� In the consultation exercise that accompanied the “refresh” process, many 
objected to the focus on this as the primary (or at least first-mentioned) function 
of the Navy on the basis that this was not a function but more a precondition for 
both sea control and maritime power projection ashore� Perhaps the desire to 
focus on the potentially transformational impact of challenges in the domains of 
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum meant that assuring access needed 
to be treated as a function on its own rather than subsumed, with much less fan-
fare, within those two historic functions of seapower� 
Of course, this emphasis on all-domain access makes perfect sense within the 
Beltway� It has the advantage that by referring to the undoubted, and potentially 
critical, rise of sea-denial capabilities around the world, it reinforces the im-
portance and the urgency of supporting the Navy’s budget and plans for future 
acquisitions� This is particularly important for the defense of the research and 
development budget, given its importance in delivering the kind of capabilities 
needed to offset the very possibly very grave consequences of significantly greater 
challenges to assured access in the future� Moreover, it links up nicely with the 
Joint Operational Access Concept released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2013 
and the recasting of the Air-Sea Battle into the Joint Concept for Access and Ma-
neuver in the Global Commons� Elevating all-domain access therefore ticks all 
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the right Washington boxes, not least that of “jointery” (what Americans might 
call “jointness”) in general and of bringing the Army on board in particular� It 
also efficiently deals with the complaints sometimes made of the 2007 version 
of the Cooperative Strategy—that it didn’t seem quite to fit in with other official 
formulations of U�S� strategy of the time� Now it clearly does� 
If the budget, joint concepts, and mismatched statements were indeed amid 
the reasons why all-domain access was given such preeminence, then it takes us 
back to the special and probably unavoidable problem that American strategy 
makers have—namely, identifying their critical target audience� When it comes 
to strategy making, Washington, with its plethora of government institutions 
and thrusting think tanks, still has the aura of imperial Rome� Defense literati 
within the capital talk to each other, but the rest of the world listens in, or tries 
to� Two thousand years ago, the barbarians of the outer world could only marvel 
at the exciting and fast-moving intricacies of imperial policy making while barely 
comprehending its nuances� The barbarians could easily oversimplify and misun-
derstand what was really going on� The same applies now� The prospect and the 
dangers of this will need careful handling� 
For this reason, all-domain access could all too easily be seen as a response to 
the purported antiaccess/area-denial concepts of the Chinese� This would worry, 
for example, many (but admittedly not all) of America’s allies and partners in 
the Asia-Pacific region� Here, as remarked earlier, much depends on who they 
are and where they are� Take, for instance, the Chinese themselves� Their naval 
expansion, the new strategy pointedly says, “presents both opportunities and 
challenges�” What will they make of the new strategy now for the first time made 
officially available to them in Mandarin? Will they see it as a challenge or an 
invitation to cooperate in defense of a rules-based order? Most likely, they will 
turn the issue around, seeing this new doctrine as presenting them with both “op-
portunities” and “challenges�” Soft-liners will go for the opportunities, looking for 
invitations to cooperate equitably in defense of an acceptable rules-based order; 
hard-liners will see it as a straight conceptual challenge and a warning�
To an increasing extent, of course, the Chinese have a developing problem 
with the rise in the hitherto modest sea-denial capabilities of their immediate 
neighbors and so a professional interest in “all-domain access with Chinese 
characteristics,” but for the moment their preoccupation is still largely with the 
security of their near seas� Most of the People’s Liberation Army Navy seems 
much more likely to see this new stress as something to be circumvented� It, and 
some local bystanders too, will interpret the emphasis on all-domain access as 
contributing to a slow, dangerous, and unnecessary American drift into a more 
adversarial relationship with China and maybe respond accordingly� 
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How navies react to the stress on all-domain access depends, as has been said 
earlier, on where and who they are and on their immediate strategic preoccupa-
tions� Many of them will modestly stand back from it, focusing instead on the 
less technologically demanding task of defending their own waters� They will 
follow the examples of Japan, Vietnam, and other countries in Southeast Asia 
concentrating on building up their own sea-denial capabilities� If so, the kind 
of all-domain-access capabilities aspired to in CS21R will tend to be regarded 
more as ones to be outflanked and offset rather than ones to be contributed to, 
even if the putative adversary is not in many cases the United States� A few more-
capable navies, however, are also interested in developing the capabilities for 
all-domain access if of a more modest sort� This would mean taking all-domain 
access as something of an agenda� Most navies will want to do both, as far as 
their resources allow—securing sufficient access for themselves and denying it to 
others—just as they always have� Where they wish to strike the balance between 
these two and their general attitude to this part of CS21R will reflect their unique 
circumstances� 
Such diversity of international reaction reminds us that the effect of strategy 
lies very much in the eye of the beholder� How effective a strategy is at securing 
the ends its framers have in mind depends very much on how people perceive and 
react to it� The stress on all-domain access is a clear risk from this point of view� 
A bad Chinese reaction to the new strategy could well increase the hesitations in 
other regional countries about cooperating with the United States, especially if 
they already have doubts of their own about U�S� intentions or reliability� In this 
all-too-likely scenario, the stress on all-domain access cuts right across CS21R’s 
“foundational principle” about the need to cooperate with navies� To avert this, a 
careful and sensitive international strategic communications campaign will need 
to follow the appearance of the refreshed strategy� 
This brings us to the third but probably most important concern about the cre-
ation of all-domain access as what at least looks like the primary function of the 
U�S� Navy� It seems to have pushed out the opportunity evident in earlier drafts 
of the refreshed strategy to redefine and reemphasize “forward naval presence” as 
a means of shaping the strategic environment, winning friends, and influencing 
people� Of course, this criticism—if that is what it is—is not completely fair since 
the importance of U�S� forward naval presence is identified as one of two founda-
tional principles in CS21R �13 Section II is in fact entitled “Forward Presence and 
Partnership” and sits, just as it should in the strategy, after a review of the interna-
tional context and before addressing the missions and functions of the U�S� Navy 
that flow from it� Despite this, the forward-presence box has not been fully ticked, 
because apart from the comparatively short introductory paragraph of Section II, 
there is no sustained discussion of the advantages of forward naval presence and 
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absolutely no attempt to identify it as a good thing, not just for the United States, 
but for the world community generally� Instead, we read a series of regional re-
views, starting with the Indo-Asia-Pacific, which identify the proposed force lev-
els needed to deliver the required forward presence region by region, ending up 
with the Arctic and Antarctic�14 Several of these regional reviews conclude with a 
brief paragraph outlining what that resultant forward naval presence is supposed 
to deliver, but these ideas are nowhere woven together into a kind of sustained 
defense of the aspiration for a forward naval presence as a whole�
At a time of fiscal constraint when it is becoming harder to balance resources 
against commitments and when the military-technical, political, and legal chal-
lenges to a forward naval presence are clearly growing, this failure to take the 
bull by the horns and address the issue directly will strike many as unfortunate� It 
could play into the hands of domestic skeptics inclined to doubt the importance 
of forward presence, especially if the attempted defense of the capability seems 
likely to be expensive, fiscally and programmatically� At the same time, the ab-
sence of a justification for forward presence runs the risk of further antagonizing 
neutral or suspicious international opinion apt to think the worst of American 
intentions, since the determination to maintain a forward naval presence could 
simply be interpreted as illustrative of aggressive intent� 
A few years ago, for instance, Major General Luo Yuan spoke for more than 
just PLA hard-liners when he said that “the so-called forward presence means 
that the United States can send its gunboats to every corner of the world� � � � This 
way, the United States can even claim the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea 
is covered within its security boundary�”15 He and others pointed out that in the 
aftermath of the sinking of ROKS Cheonan, were USS George Washington to have 
sailed into the Yellow Sea, its aircraft would have been capable of reaching Beijing� 
If to this particular concern is added a general strategic culture deeply affected 
by the country’s historical exposure to threats from the sea and by the disastrous 
consequences for China of a failure to deter naval activities of this sort, Chinese 
sensitivity to the unauthorized presence and activity of foreign navies in “Chinese 
waters” is understandable� The point is that other countries, not the least India, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, share to some extent such hesitations about 
the unauthorized forward presence of (other) great-power naval forces�16
Since a forward U�S� naval presence is not in fact regarded by a sizable chunk 
of international opinion as a universal good to be welcomed, the failure to dis-
cuss and justify it in a doctrinal statement that will be avidly studied around the 
world seems a lost opportunity� Hitherto, the principle has largely been defended 
negatively by freedom-of-navigation exercises and repeated recourse to West-
ern interpretations of the law of the sea� To win support, it is not enough to say 
merely that something is legal; it needs also to be shown to be “right�” The case 
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for forward presence needs to be made positively� Sadly, the new strategy does not 
explicitly do that� This failure, together with the emphasis on the function of all-
domain access, will reinforce the perception, and not just among the paranoid, 
that the U�S� Navy is only interested in maintaining a forward naval presence as 
a precondition for its capacity to threaten countries� This is, of course, part of it, 
but there is so much more to tell� 
Paradoxically the case would be relatively easy to make� Much of the illustra-
tive material used to explain the ideas in CS21R indeed could be rebrigaded into 
a justification for forward presence� For instance, a forward naval presence, even 
off unwelcoming shores, provides 24/7 general assurance for all legitimate sea 
users� It facilitates maritime domain awareness, which is a universal good in that 
it increases the effectiveness of the international response to all forms of criminal 
activity at sea that threaten everybody, directly or indirectly� Forward presence 
also supports rapid and effective responses to natural disasters� In contested areas 
a forward naval presence can serve as a calming mechanism� More generally, a 
forward naval presence is part and parcel of naval diplomacy, allowing events 
to be monitored, relationships developed over time, and stability defended� The 
bones of a persuasive argument are easily discernible� 
At the moment, most countries accept, albeit with a shade of reluctance in 
some quarters, that, in Kishore Mahbubani’s words, 
the real reason why most international waterways remain safe and open—and 
thereby facilitate the huge explosion of global trade we have seen—is that the Ameri-
can Navy acts as the guarantor of last resort to keep them open� Without the global 
presence of the US Navy, our world order would be less orderly�17
For this reason too, the notion of a global maritime partnership, outlined in the 
first version of the strategy, positively extended the concept to the world’s other 
navies by providing an opportunity for them to join the U�S� Navy “on the beat”; 
the idea was generally welcomed around the world, since it addressed problems 
held in common, such as the threat of piracy, drug smuggling, international ter-
rorism, human trafficking, and catastrophic natural disasters� Any of these could 
directly threaten sea-based trade and other legitimate forms of sea use and indi-
rectly jeopardize the local stability afloat and ashore on which that trade depends� 
Hence nations participated in a multitude of cooperative multinational naval 
activities designed to curb these shared problems, to build up local capacities 
to handle them in the future, and where necessary to engage in security-sector 
reform� More discussion of this would have helped sustain the general argument 
for a forward presence and so added to the international appeal of CS21R�
The fact that the strategy has been issued in a number of different languages, 
including Mandarin, shows that its authors are well aware of the importance of 
its international appeal, not least because of the expanding need for the Navy 
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to operate alongside those of its allies and partners� Because so much emphasis 
remains in the document on the essential role of America’s allies and partners as 
a means of narrowing the gap between what must be done by the United States 
alone and what can be, the response of regional countries to this new strategy will 
be key to its success over the next decade� It is worth repeating the point that the 
relative absence of discussion on the advantages of naval diplomacy in winning 
friends and influencing people seems a pity� 
The reactions of those different navies and the countries and regions they de-
fend will of course vary, in accordance with their strategic situations� Countries 
like Japan and the Philippines, wary of China’s rising power, will probably broadly 
welcome the new emphasis on the all-domain-access function and the apparent 
reinforcement of the “rebalance” suggested by the special prominence given to 
the “Indo-Asia-Pacific” region� Both of these indicate the U�S� determination to 
stay in the western Pacific despite China’s “counter-interventionary” strategies, 
and that resolve would seem to underline for Japan and the Philippines the U�S� 
security guarantee� 
But even in those two countries there will probably be a small constituency 
of opinion that will worry that the new muscularity of CS21R will be found pro-
vocative in Beijing and so will worsen the atmosphere� It would be surprising if 
Beijing in general and the People’s Liberation Army Navy in particular did not 
find aspects of the new strategy provocative, at least in public� China has after 
all for the first time been identified as a security concern, and all-domain access 
certainly looks like a response to the antiaccess/area-denial strategies with which 
the Chinese have been associated� 
Countries with currently better relations with China, such as Thailand, Ma-
laysia, and Indonesia, may share these concerns about what some critics will 
undoubtedly consider the offensive tone of the new strategy; they may also be 
encouraged in this response by the reduced emphasis apparently given to the 
general maritime security concerns that tend to be higher in their national de-
fense priorities� Illegal fishing, human and drug trafficking, and other forms of 
criminal activity at sea are actually their most immediate concerns� U�S� support 
of efforts against crime (especially in the shape of U�S� Coast Guard activity) is of 
course frequently referenced in the early part of the strategy, but explicit cover-
age of the role is less than it was in the 2007 strategy, because Section III is about 
national security rather than the American contribution to the defense of the 
system� Maritime security is indeed “a promising area for expanded cooperation 
with our allies and partners,” and so the less-explicit emphasis on it given in the 
new version of the strategy means there is less to offset its putative muscularity�18 
How other navies respond to the whole package will doubtless reflect how they 
perceive this shift in its balance� 
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The same pattern of response will probably be replicated in other parts of 
the world too� Countries with concerns about an overmighty neighbor, such as 
Iran or a newly truculent Russia, and in need of reassurance will welcome the 
American emphasis on maintaining a forward presence for the same reasons 
as Japan and the Philippines, moderated only by concerns about the relative 
priority apparently accorded their respective regions when compared with the 
Indo-Asia-Pacific� Whether it is intended or not, describing American interests 
in geographic regions sequentially looks like a priority list, and Europeans will 
note without surprise that they have slipped to position three behind Asia and 
the Middle East� Africans come next, then neighbors of the United States in the 
Western Hemisphere� That the region closest to the United States and central to 
its homeland security comes just fifth in the list suggests that it is not in fact a 
priority list; nonetheless, that is how it will be seen�
Finally, reactions to the new strategy will also reflect different constituencies 
within countries as well as their positions in various geographic regions� Profes-
sional opinion in the world’s other navies will probably neither be surprised nor 
in many cases much dismayed at much in this strategy� A great deal of academic 
and professional attention has been paid to the rise around the world of military-
technical constraints on naval maneuver near to land and its portentous implica-
tions for the future utility of naval power;19 there has been a natural and parallel 
rise in blue-water aspirations and capabilities, not least in the Asia-Pacific�20 
Navies with such aspirations (or that privately assume they might have such as-
pirations one day) will want to maintain access too� Accordingly, the U�S� Navy’s 
explicit determination to maintain access and forward presence, and through this 
the whole gamut of the traditional naval capabilities that flow from sea control, 
will seem to other navies both natural and right—although in some cases, their 
professional sympathy for the Navy’s determination to maintain the strategic 
value of seapower in general may be kept decently private, if only because of the 
concerns of their political masters� Navies that know they will always be limited 
in their aspirations to negative sea-denial strategies, in contrast, will naturally be 
much less sympathetic professionally to the main thrust of the strategy�
The variation and complexity of the international response to CS21R and its 
importance as a means of winning friends and influencing people suggest that 
the U�S� maritime services will need to devote significant effort to their strategic 
communications plan� The problem is that the necessary audiences are varied, 
and to allay their different and often competing concerns and to build up the 
required support, the messaging will need to be tailored to particular audiences� 
This will require considerable skill and effort�
How the U�S� sea services communicate CS21R may generate the same dif-
ficulties the Obama administration faced when launching its pivot/rebalance 
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toward Asia� This occasioned huge, almost unending, debate about what it all 
meant, with different countries wanting to hear different things and major defini-
tional problems for the administration� While no one would argue against serious 
reflection on strategic matters as a means of enhancing the quality of thought, 
there is a pragmatic argument against making its conclusions too public, espe-
cially when addressed to multiple audiences� Rather than announce with fanfare 
such statements of general policy purposes, perhaps one should just get on and 
do them! After all, what a policy means is usually best clarified by what the policy 
maker does� But this, in the immediate aftermath of the delivery of one of the 
world’s most interesting doctrinal statements on twenty-first-century seapower 
for years, is probably best left to another article and another time� 
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